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Husserl on Other Minds 
Philip J. Walsh 
 
Abstract 
Husserlian phenomenology, as the study of conscious experience, has often been accused of 
solipsism. Husserl’s method, it is argued, does not have the resources to provide an account of 
consciousness of other minds. This chapter will address this issue by providing a brief overview of 
the multiple angles from which Husserl approached the theme of intersubjectivity, with specific 
focus on the details of his account of the concrete interpersonal encounter – “empathy.” Husserl 
understood empathy as a direct, quasi-perceptual form of intentionality through which the sense of 
the Other is constituted. Furthermore, his account of empathy is holistically integrated with his 
overall theory of intersubjectivity, including his discussions of the objectivity of nature, and the 
social, historical, and communal aspects of subjectivity. Husserl’s theory of empathy continues to 
cast a long shadow, influencing both the analytic and continental approaches to the problem of 
other minds, as well as contemporary account of social cognition in the cognitive sciences.  
 
1. Introduction 
Husserlian phenomenology, as the study of conscious experience, has often been criticized 
(or misunderstood) as solipsistic, and thus lacking the resources to provide an account of our 
awareness of other minds. Philosophical accounts of awareness of other minds involve both the 
narrower issue of how the other is constituted in consciousness in the second-personal mode (the 
face-to-face encounter with the other), as well as broader issues regarding how the natural and 
cultural world have distinctively intersubjective meaning for us. In this chapter I will discuss the 
former in terms of “empathy” and the latter in terms of “intersubjectivity.” While acknowledging 
some of Husserl’s shortcomings, I aim to distill and clarify Husserl’s wide-ranging investigations into 
empathic and intersubjective forms of experience.  
As several commentators have noted in recent years, since the publication of Husserl’s 
Nachlass manuscripts on intersubjectivity, it is no longer tenable to paint Husserl as a Cartesian 
methodological solipsist “who sought to reduce the entire meaningful world to the activity of the 
solus ipse” (Moran 2016, 108). While the contents of these manuscripts do indeed have far-ranging 
implications for Husserl scholarship, a comprehensive discussion of these texts exceeds what is 
possible in this short chapter.1 Thus, I will focus primarily on Husserl’s most focused treatment of 
the topic in the Fifth Meditation of his Cartesian Meditations (Husserl 1960), along with some of the 
 
1 For more comprehensive discussion of these manuscripts, see Mensch (1988), Zahavi (1996), and Kern (2019).  
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material that was posthumously published as the second book his Ideas (Husserl 1989). I begin by 
establishing the historical context from which Husserl’s account arose in the early 20th century, 
specifically Lipps’s introduction of the term empathy into theorizing about social cognition and 
Scheler’s phenomenological critique (§2). For Husserl, empathy was not just some special 
application or curiosity for phenomenological investigation. On the contrary, his theory of empathy 
was central to his understanding of phenomenology as transcendental philosophy. Accordingly, 
before laying out the technical details of his account of empathy (§4), I will first situate the concept 
of empathy within Husserl’s bigger picture of intersubjectivity (§3). The account of empathy opens 
upon broader theoretical horizons concerning the objectivity of natural science, socio-cultural and 
historical meaning, and Husserl’s notion of the lifeworld. Finally, I will conclude by briefly outlining 
Husserl’s legacy in this area (§5), both in recent work in analytic philosophy of mind and cognitive 
science on “social cognition,” and the broader tradition of continental phenomenology.  
 
2. Historical context 
It is difficult to pin down a univocal concept of empathy that ranges over contemporary 
accounts of social cognition in psychology, cognitive science, and philosophy. At times it refers to 
the relatively sophisticated cognitive ability to imaginatively transpose oneself into someone else’s 
shoes, and thus understand what it would be like to be them.2  In other contexts, it refers to the 
ability to recognize the body language and facial expressions of others as expressive of specific 
mental states, such as anger or joy.3 And in still other contexts it refers to an even more basic 
capacity to distinguish the animate from the inanimate, or the minded from the non-minded, in 
one’s perceptual field.4 In the philosophical framework of the classical “problem of other minds,” 
talk of empathy often has specific epistemological connotations regarding evidence and justification 
for beliefs about the mental states of others.5 For moral philosophers, empathy often involves not 
only understanding but caring about the other.6 
 
2 This way of understanding empathy arguably goes back to Adam Smith’s original discussions of ‘sympathy’ (Smith, 
1853). See also, Goldie (2000); Coplan (2011). 
3 Lipps (1907) originally focused heavily on facial expressions and imitation. This understanding of empathy is 
particularly salient in the literature on mirror neurons; see also, Gallese (2001); Gallese and Goldman (1998).  
4 Studies of perceived animacy or intentional behavior go back to at least Heider and Simmel (1944) and Michotte 
(1963); see also, Gallagher and Miyahara (2012); Walsh (2014).  
5 Goldman (2002); see Stueber (2006) for discussion.   
6 Darwall (1998); Hoffman (2000); Slote (2010). 
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 Husserl would, no doubt, be frustrated by the lack of conceptual rigor in this contemporary 
milieu, just as he seems to have been in his own time. One can detect his suspicion of the concept in 
Cartesian Meditations, as he characterizes his discussion of “a transcendental theory of experiencing someone 
else [Fremderfahrung]” as a theory of “so-called ‘empathy’” (Husserl 1960, 92). As Zahavi notes, 
Fremderfahrung was Husserl’s preferred term, although he still used Einfühlung frequently (Zahavi 
2014, 114). The term itself originated in the German aesthetics tradition, and was first used in the 
context of social cognition by Theodore Lipps. The American psychologist Edward Titchener then 
translated Einfühlung as ‘empathy’ (Stueber 2019). Lipps was an influential figure in philosophy and 
psychology in Munich in the early 20th Century. Though ultimately critical of Lipps, Husserl, along 
with other early phenomenologists such as Edith Stein and Max Scheler, effectively agreed with his 
critique of John Stuart Mill’s inference from analogy account of empathy (Lipps 1907). The 
inference from analogy account, briefly stated, argues that one’s awareness of other minds is based 
on drawing an inference from the similarity of the observed behavior of the other to one’s own 
behavior. That is, upon seeing the other’s body move a certain way – say, lips turned upward – I 
judge her to be happy by inferring that this behavior is caused by the same mental state that causes 
similar behavior in my own case.   
 Lipps criticized Mill’s inference from analogy for assuming what it sets out to prove. The 
inference is only valid on the assumption that other is psychologically similar to me in the first place. 
Lipps’s own solution, which foreshadows some features of contemporary simulation theory (see §5 
below), was to conceive of empathy as a kind of instinctual and direct mirroring or resonance 
between minds. More precisely, for Lipps, one’s grasp of the other’s mental life does not arise from 
a sophisticated multi-step cognitive procedure (as in the inference from analogy), but rather from a 
kind of of automatic inner imitation of the other’s mental state, which is projected onto her observed 
behavior. Among phenomenologists, Scheler offered the most detailed rejection of Lipps’s 
imitation-plus-projection model (Scheler 2008). A major point of Scheler’s critique was that Lipps’s 
account still operated on the assumption that we do not have access to the psychic life of the other, 
only to her physical behavior. But this does not do phenomenological justice to how we actually 
experience others. As Scheler, Husserl, and Stein all argued, the primary data of the experience of 
others is expressive phenomena. That is, we encounter the joy of the other in her laughter. We are 
directly acquainted with the anger of the other in her furrowed brow. While it is true that the mental 
states of the other are not experienced in the same modality as one experiences one’s own mental 
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states, this does not preclude them from being given directly in our experience of the other. In other 
words, we should not conflate the directness versus indirectness of access to mental states with first-
personal versus third-personal modality of experiencing those mental states (Zahavi 2014, 130). I cannot 
experience the other’s anger in the first-person modality in which she experiences it, but this does 
not mean that the other’s anger is not directly there before me as I look at her. As Husserl succinctly 
puts it, “Quite rightly, therefore, we speak of perceiving someone else” (Husserl 1960, 124). 
 
3. Intersubjectivity, broadly construed 
 Reconciling the directness with which other minds are given with the fact that they 
ultimately transcend that givenness occupied Husserl throughout his entire career. The fifth chapter 
of Cartesian Meditations is Husserl’s most focused articulation of how the other is constituted in 
consciousness. A striking feature of this text is Husserl’s clear insistence that a theory of empathy is 
not a special problem or merely marginal issue. Rather, the account of how the other is constituted 
in experience is central to phenomenology’s aims as transcendental philosophy. The account of 
empathy is central to the account of how the objective world of nature as well as the socio-cultural 
world of history are constituted.  
 
3.1. Transcendental Intersubjectivity and the Objectivity of Nature 
First, consider what it means to experience the natural world as “objective” or “out there, 
independent of my experience of it.” For Husserl, the natural world is constituted as objective in 
virtue of one’s experience of it as something intersubjectively available. Even after performing the 
phenomenological epoché, whereby one brackets any position-taking on the existence of the world, 
one still experiences an objective world:  
In any case then, within myself, within the limits of my transcendentally reduced pure 
conscious life, I experience the world (including others) – and, according to its experiential 
sense, not as (so to speak) my private synthetic formation but as other than mine alone, as an 
intersubjective world, actually there for everyone, accessible in respect of its Objects to 
everyone. (Husserl 1960, 91) 
We do not experience the world as wholly and truly mind-independent until the world is 
experienced as there for others. Accordingly, “the intrinsically first other (the first ‘non-Ego’) is the other 
Ego” (Husserl 1960, 92). The constitution of the other in empathic experience thereby “makes 
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constitutionally possible a new infinite domain of what is ‘other’: an Objective Nature and a whole 
Objective world” (Husserl 1960, 107). The constitution of the world as objective is not possible if 
that constitutive activity is limited to all of my possible conscious acts. Rather, the objectivity of the 
world obtains in virtue of it being the possible correlate of constitutive acts that could never, in 
principle, be mine. 
 In order to further understand this key tenet of Husserl’s theory of transcendental 
intersubjectivity, consider Husserl’s analysis of perception from the perspective of the singular ego. 
Perceptual experience essentially consists of presentation and appresentation. That is, in any given 
moment of perceptual experience, the specific profile of the object is explicitly given to 
consciousness is situated within a network (or, horizon) of implicitly “co-present” or “appresented” 
further possible profiles. Whatever is given in experience, in the “strict” sense of givenness, includes 
as an essential moment an “intending-beyond-itself” (Husserl 1960, 46). As Husserl summarizes this, 
presentation and appresentation “are so fused that they stand within the functional community of one 
perception” (Husserl 1960, 122). This analysis of the “communalization” of perception in the case of 
the singular ego serves as the model for an analogous intersubjective communalization: 
By virtue of the mentioned communalization of constitutive intentionality, the 
transcendental intersubjectivity has an intersubjective sphere of ownness, in which it constitutes 
the Objective world; and thus, as the transcendental “We”, it is a subjectivity for this world 
an also for the world of men, which is the form in which it has made itself Objectively 
actual. (Husserl 1960,107) 
In the intersubjectivity manuscripts Husserl further characterizes this communalization of 
constitutive intentionality in terms of the “being-within-one-another” or, as Moran puts it, the 
“interwovenness,” of different experiential streams (Moran 2016). The “interweaving” of 
intersubjective conscious experiences is an instance (with important differences, to be sure) of the 
more general phenomenon of how conscious experiences are interwoven to constitute objectivities.  
 At this point it may seem that transcendental intersubjectivity (and its intentional correlate, 
the objective world) has a secondary or subordinate status in Husserl’s philosophy. After all, it is 
only reached through an analysis of singular egoic consciousness. Solipsistic egology, however, is 
only methodologically prior to intersubjective phenomenology, and, as Carr puts it, “priority in order of 
inquiry does not imply priority in the order of being” (Carr 1973, 31). Husserl actually designates 
phenomenology’s “transcendental solipsism” as methodologically prior but “philosophically 
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subordinate” to transcendental intersubjectivity (Husserl 1960, 30-31). Furthermore, in various 
places Husserl stresses the primordiality of what he calls the “personalistic” attitude over the 
naturalistic attitude. This means that it is actually the shared human world, or lifeworld, within which 
the objective world of nature is disclosed to us, “especially in and through natural scientific research, 
which is itself a cultural activity” (Moran 2016, 114). 
 
3.2. Sociality, Community, Historicity 
 Later in his career, Husserl increasingly articulated his vision of phenomenological 
philosophy in terms of this concept of the lifeworld. The lifeworld is the shared world of human 
communities and cultural objects in all of their concreteness, prior to any theorizing or abstraction. 
The lifeworld is the world of chairs and tables, as opposed to “physical objects” with such and such 
geometric properties. Aforementioned notions of transcendental intersubjectivity, or the 
“transcendental community of monads,” and the correlative objective world or “Nature,” float at a 
level of abstraction removed from historical and cultural milieu in which theorizing begins in the 
first place. In Cartesian Meditations, Husserl gestures at this ultimate direction for phenomenology, 
through which, “with systematic progress…the transcendental sense of the world must also become 
disclosed to us ultimately in the full concreteness with which it is incessantly the life-world for us all” 
(Husserl 1960, 136).  
Thus, just as there is a transcendental “We,” there are lifewordly (concrete, socially and 
historically situated) communalized interweavings of consciousness to which the first-person plural 
pronoun “we” can refer. Founded upon a shared perceptual world and reciprocal empathic 
recognition, subjects form a We through communicative action. Through such “social acts,” Husserl 
explains, “spiritual Objectivities of a peculiar kind” become constituted. These “plural subjects” 
encompass “various types of social communities,” which Husserl dubs “‘personalities of a higher order’” 
(Husserl 1960, 132).7 Such social groupings are the constitutive basis for human communities, whose 
own form of continuity and intentional interwovenness constitute the “historicity” of the cultural 
world. Although this shared, inter-generational form of historical temporality differs in essential 
 
7 The term “plural subject” comes from contemporary accounts of collective intentionality, namely Gilbert (1989), and is 
not Husserl’s, who uses “higher order persons” or “personalities of a higher order.” Speaking of plural subjects, 
however, is not anachronistic, as Husserl’s account of higher order persons closely aligns with (and can be used to 
question) several contemporary accounts of plural subjects and collective intentionality. See Szanto (2016) for an 
excellent overview and critical discussion. 
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ways from basic structures of egoic time-consciousness, both constitute “a priori” structures of 
experience: 
I know myself to be factually within a generative framework, in the unitary flow of a 
historical development in which this present is mankind’s present and world of which it is 
conscious is a historical present with a historical past and a historical future…but this form 
of generativity and historicity is unbreakable, as is the form, belonging to me as an individual 
ego, of my original perceptual present as a present with a remembered past and expectable 
future. (Husserl 1970, 253) 
All of these structures, keep in mind – intersubjectivity, sociality, community, historicity – are made 
constitutionally possible by empathy.  Just as every ego-subject has a perceptual horizon, “so every 
ego-subject has his horizon of empathy, that of his cosubjects,” and thus “within the vitally flowing 
intentionality in which the life of an ego-subject consists, every other ego is already intentionally 
implicated in advance by way of empathy and the empathy-horizon” (Husserl 1970, 255). We see, 
therefore, in Husserl’s most mature stage, the holistic integration of his account of empathy with his 
wide-ranging meditations on the phenomenological significance of other minds.  
 
4. The basic structures of empathy 
4.1. Solipsism, the Other, and phenomenological method 
 If empathy, understood as the concrete interpersonal encounter of self and other, founds the 
possibility of the robustly intersubjective forms of experience discussed in the previous section, then 
we must examine what makes empathy possible at all. Before examining the details of Husserl’s 
account of the essential structures of empathic experience, however, it is necessary to clarify just 
what problem Husserl thinks he is solving in providing an account of empathy. Husserl was acutely 
aware of the fact that phenomenology, as a matter of methodology, risked being “branded…as 
transcendental solipsism” (Husserl 1960, 89). Husserl wonders, “Do I not become a solus ipse…as 
long as I carry on a consistent self-explication under the name phenomenology?” (Husserl 1960, 89). 
But it is not the task of phenomenology to solve the traditional problem of other minds in the 
context of a realist metaphysics and epistemology. Husserl is not seeking to prove the existence of 
consciousness other than one’s own. Rather, he is providing an account of how the other becomes 
constituted in experience at all. That is, his inquiry concerns how the sense-constituting processes of 
consciousness disclose the Other as not just an object but as a consciousness distinct from those 
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very processes. Thus, in Cartesian Meditations he sets out to obtain “insight into the explicit and 
implicit intentionality wherein the alter ego become evinced and verified in the realm of our 
transcendental ego,” and thereby “discover in what intentionalities, syntheses, motivations, the sense 
‘other ego’ becomes fashioned in me” (Husserl 1960, 90).  
For the phenomenologist, the intentional object toward which experience is directed is 
constituted through harmonious streams of experience; but something about how the Other is 
constituted in experience violates this principle; the other is somehow something more than “a point 
of intersection belonging to my constitutive synthesis” (Husserl 1960, 105). The constitution of the 
other cannot be understood analogously to the constitution of perceptual objects. In the case of the 
latter, there are always further sides or aspects that are unavailable in a particular moment of 
consciousness of the object. These further aspects, however, are not unavailable in principle, and this 
is what differentiates perceptual experience from empathic experience. In the case of empathy, an 
intentional object – the Other – is constituted in harmonious streams of experience as any object is, 
but the Other shows up to us as the Other precisely insofar as there necessarily remains some aspect 
of the object that cannot become available to us; namely, their inner subjective life: 
Although the other is constituted as “being there in person,” we must admit that  
[P]roperly speaking, neither the other Ego himself, nor his subjective processes or his 
appearances themselves, nor anything else belonging to his own essence, becomes given in 
our experience originally. If it were, if what belongs to the other’s own essence were directly 
accessible, it would be merely a moment of my own essence, and ultimately he himself and I 
myself would be the same. (Husserl 1960, 109) 
In other words, there is a necessary asymmetry between how the sense-constituting processes of 
one’s own consciousness and those of the other are given in experience. This asymmetry is not an 
epistemic shortcoming. Rather, it is constitutive of what Otherness even is (Overgaard 2005; Walsh 
2014). The Other is accessible precisely insofar as they are constituted as ultimately inaccessible. 
 Inquiring into the specific forms of experience that make this kind of sense-constitution 
possible pushes Husserl methodologically. In Cartesian Meditations he finds that he must go further 
than the traditional phenomenological epoché, whereby any position-taking on the existence of what 
is given in consciousness is bracketed. The residue of the Other’s consciousness remains throughout 
phenomenologically reduced experience. Within the epoché the natural world still shows up as 
transcendent – that is, as intersubjectively available and not a private construction of the solus ipse. 
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Artifacts like tables and chairs still show up as artifacts – that is, as cultural objects with a sense that 
implies a world of others. Thus, a further step is needed beyond the epoché in order to isolate what 
Husserl calls the “primordial sphere of ownness,” which excludes any constitutive effects of other 
minds. He performs what he calls a “peculiar” version of the epoché that not only brackets the 
existence of what is constituted in consciousness, but also proceeds to “abstract” everything that 
involves an intersubjective sense (Husserl 1960, 95-96). This leaves the ego with the pure “stratum” 
of harmonious intuitive givenness that constitutes the natural world, but this is no longer the 
“objective” nature studied by science, since the latter includes in its sense its being intersubjectively 
available. One is left instead with “mere Nature” – the nature “included in my ownness” (Husserl 1960, 
96).  
Within this mere Nature, one’s own bodily self-awareness stands out as unique within the 
constitution of the rest of the field of experience; for one’s awareness of one’s own body essentially 
differs from one’s experience of any other object within the sphere of ownness. One experiences 
one’s own body as animate, “the only Object ‘in’ which I ‘rule and govern’ immediately” (Husserl 1960, 
97). The uniqueness of bodily self-awareness is part of the constitutive asymmetry described above. 
“Others” are still constituted within the sphere of ownness, but only as mere physical bodies 
precisely because of the asymmetry between one’s own bodily self-experience (which includes 
awareness of one’s body as both object that can be seen and touched and as volitional structure 
within which one “rules and governs”) and experience of other’s bodies (which only show up as 
objects that can be seen and touched). This asymmetry of bodily givenness is central to Husserl’s 
sophisticated account of how empathy is possible. Ultimately, it is my own bodily self-awareness that 
allows me to grasp the other as truly Other, as another animate being like me.   
 
4.2. Bodily self-awareness, pairing, and the similarity condition 
Husserl’s grounding of empathic recognition of the Other in one’s own first-personal bodily 
self-awareness has largely been viewed as problematic at best and an abject failure at worst. He 
characterizes the structure of empathy as an “analogizing apperception,” and an instance of 
“pairing,” which is a “universal phenomenon of the transcendental sphere” (Husserl 1960, 112). The 
intentional target of empathic experience is the body of the other, which, even within the peculiar 
sphere of ownness, “is nevertheless apprehended as an animate organism,” which, he reasons, “must 
have derived this sense by an apperceptive transfer from my animate organism” in a way that is “direct” and 
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“primordial” (Husserl 1960, 110-111). In other words, as discussed above, the unique sense one has 
of one’s own body serves as the basis for the apperceptive surplus that imbues the (otherwise merely 
physical) body of the Other with the sense “animate.” The way the body of the Other shows up is 
“paired” with the way one’s own bodily self-awareness, and thus one sees the Other as an animate, 
sensing being.  
But how is this “pairing” possible, given that Husserl has already established that one’s own 
bodily self-awareness is utterly unique in the primordial sphere of ownness? Husserl explains this by 
claiming that pairing, or the “analogizing apperception” constitutive of empathic experience, is a 
form of “intentional overreach” that obtains in virtue of a perceived similarity. In a case of 
perceptual pairing, for example, suppose one perceives object X as having properties A and B. One 
then perceives object Y as also possessing property A. Pairing is form of “association,” or “passive 
synthesis,” whereby on the basis of a prominent perceived similarity between X and Y (property A), 
one thereby automatically perceives Y as also instantiating property B. To use an example from A.D. 
Smith, if I see a durian fruit for the first time and, upon investigating it more closely, experience its 
pungent smell, when I see a subsequent durian fruit (despite not smelling it), I will experience it as 
also having that smell (Smith 2003, 225). Husserl is clear that the similarity condition is key here: “It 
is clear from the very beginning that only a similarity connecting, within my primordial sphere, that 
body over there with my body can serve as the motivational basis for the ‘analogizing’ apprehension of 
that body as another animate organism” (Husserl 1960, 111). Since it has already been demonstrated 
that the inner awareness one has of one’s own body is utterly unique in the field of primordial 
givenness, then the similarity that grounds empathic pairing must be based one’s external awareness 
of one’s body – that is, how one’s awareness of one’s own body as a material thing.  
It is this account of pairing, with its reliance on the similarity condition, that has drawn some 
of the sharpest ire from critics.8 As several commentators have pointed out, the way one’s own body 
becomes perceptual constituted to one as a material object is fundamentally limited, and thus is a 
dubious basis for grounding a similarity between it and the body of the other. In other words, the 
way the body of another is given in perceptual consciousness fundamentally differs from how one is 
aware of one’s own physical body. One cannot, as a matter of principle, see the back of one’s head, 
or one’s own eyes, and so on. Husserl does not broach this difficulty in Cartesian Meditations, and 
seems to assume that the visual similarity is good enough, as he largely situates analogous 
 
8 See Luo (2016) for a recent overview of influential criticisms of Husserl’s account, namely the similarity condition.  
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appresentation in the visual modality, “and presupposes recognition of the visual similarity between 
the body of the other and the own living and lived body” (De Preester 2008, 134).  
This problem seems to have been a thorn in Husserl’s side, as he suggests multiple 
alternative ways to ground the similarity between self and other. As Luo (2016) points out, “Around 
1926/27, Husserl comes up with a second solution by considering the bodily givenness delineated 
by tactual experience, so as to distance himself from the visual model of bodily givenness” (Luo 
2016, 9). Elsewhere, in a footnote in Ideas II, Husserl expresses doubts about visual similarity and 
suggests the auditory modality, namely one’s experience of voice, as the primordial motivation basis 
for empathy.9 The tactile and auditory modalities seem more promising insofar as they both possess 
a more salient form of auto-affection than vision. In touching a surface, for example, I not only 
experience the touched property of the surface, but I also feel my hand being “touched back” by the 
surface. In virtue of this peculiar two-sidedeness of tactile experience we might find the resources to 
locate a primordial form of intersubjectivity, or at least the seed of its possible genesis, within bodily 
self-experience: the touching-touched relation in auto-affection exhibits a kind of reversibility, 
whereby the passivity of the being-touched can always reverse into the activity of touching, and vice-
versa. Merleau-Ponty made a great deal of this, and heavily mined Husserl’s accounts of the lived 
body, tactile awareness, and empathic experience in the development of his own theory of 
intersubjectivity with concepts such as the flesh, reversibility, and the chiasm. I will briefly return to 
this point in the final section discussing Husserl’s legacy. 
  
4.3. Expressivity 
 Both Cartesian Meditations and Husserl’s voluminous unpublished manuscripts, however, 
contain an alternative possibility for understanding empathy. In several places, rather than 
explicating the bodily basis of empathic recognition in terms of similarity, Husserl focuses on the 
distinctive constitutive syntheses that disclose expressive behavior. In other words, the target of 
empathic experience may not necessarily be constituted by the recognition of similarity, but rather of 
distinctive temporal sequences of the body of the other that stand out as ‘conduct’ or ‘behavior’ 
rather than mere physical movement.  In Cartesian Meditations Husserl claims that it is the 
“incessantly harmonious ‘behavior’” of the Other that makes them stand out as an animate organism, 
and they become “experienced as a pseudo-organism, precisely if there is something discordant 
 
9 See Derrida (2011) for an influential commentary on the nature of voice as auto-affection in Husserl.  
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about its behavior” (Husserl 1960, 114). Empathy targets “the other’s organism and specifically the 
organismal conduct” (Husserl 1960, 119, my emphasis). In empathy, ‘behavior’ or ‘conduct’ is 
distinguished from the mere movement of a physical object insofar as the former appears as being 
governed (Husserl 1960, 91). While in Ideas II he describes the “unity of expression” as the “intuitive unity 
presenting itself when we grasp a person as such,” and as the “only means” by which “the person of 
the other is there at all for the experiencing subject” (Husserl 1989, 248, 257).  
 If expressive phenomena are what motivate empathic pairing, the question remains as to 
why or how certain phenomena count as expressive in the first place. This could bring us back to 
the similarity condition, whereby expressive phenomena are constituted as such in virtue of a 
perceived similarity to one’s own expressive behavior. On an alternative, and as some commentators 
have noted arguably more promising, account what motivates empathic pairing is a reciprocity or 
complementarity between the expressive behavior of self and other (Smith 2003, 243; Zahavi 2014, 
136). Thus, we can account for the conditions that mark the appearance of expressive phenomena 
not in terms of similarity, but rather in terms of a history of interaction with the other whereby 
certain movements come to count as expressive in virtue of a learned history – a “sedimentation” of 
experience that “institutes” a horizon of expectation (Husserl 1960, 111). This resonates with 
contemporary “enactive” accounts that ground intersubjectivity in the emergent phenomena that 
arise from actual interactive behavior (Gallagher 2001; 2016).  
 
5. Husserlian empathy and its shadow 
 Husserl’s account of empathy has proven seminal for 20th Century philosophy. Discussions 
of Husserl can be found in both analytic and continental discussions of intersubjectivity, as well as 
contemporary work on social cognition in the cognitive sciences. As alluded to above, different 
aspects of Husserl’s account of empathy resonate with both contemporary simulationist and 
enactivist theories. To give a very brief and rough overview: over the past several decades, a major 
debate about knowledge of other minds within analytic philosophy of mind and the cognitive 
sciences has pitted “theory-theory” (TT) against “simulation-theory” (ST). TT claims that knowledge 
of other minds is achieved through the development of a folk-psychological theory of the other. ST 
argues that we come to understand others by simulating their mental states. The details of each, of 
course, are far more complex than can be explored here. TT need not necessarily be thought of as 
employing explicit conscious deliberation, but rather understood in terms of sub-personal 
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representation. The nature of the “simulation” of others’ mental states in ST can be characterized as 
a sophisticated imaginative process, or a kind of direct bodily resonance, or some combination of 
both.10  
 In recent years, certain versions of ST that focus on the nature and function of the mirror 
neuron system have proven especially interesting to Husserl scholarship. Mirror neurons are present 
in several parts of primate brains related to motor control and the sense of touch, and activate both 
when the animal acts and when it observes the same action by another. Thus, several scientists and 
philosophers have put forward theories claiming that mirror neurons are the basis of a kind of direct 
bodily understanding of our awareness of other minds (Gallese 2001; Gallese & Goldman 1998). 
The function of the mirror neuron system and the extent to which it grounds social cognition is still 
very much a contentious issue (Hickok 2009; 2014; Spaulding 2012), but as Husserl scholars have 
noted, the idea that social cognition is grounded in a kind of direct bodily “mirroring” or 
“resonance” is very similar to several parts of Husserl’s discussions of empathy, bodily awareness, 
and pairing (Thompson 2001; Ratcliffe 2006; De Preester 2008). Husserl discusses the experience of 
seeing oneself in the mirror in the section of Ideas II devoted to the constitution of the body as both 
material object and bearer of sensations (Husserl 1989, 155 fn. 1.). And in Cartesian Meditations he 
goes so far as to say that “the other is a ‘mirroring’ of my own self” (but “not a mirroring proper”) 
(Husserl 1960, 94). De Preester succinctly summarizes the affinity: 
[T]he role of the mirror neurons system is to match an external, unknown event to an 
internal, known event… This can easily be reformulated in Husserlian terminology: the 
visual perception of the body of the other is mapped onto our own kinaesthetic 
representation, or the Körper is mapped onto the Leib (and receives the latter’s status). (De 
Preester 2008, 139) 
As Zahavi (2012) has argued, however, the compatibility of Husserl’s theory of empathy and mirror-
neuron-based accounts is questionable, as mirroring is too static of a concept to capture the 
“dynamic and dialectical” aspects of Husserl’s mature view.   
 Enactive theories of social cognition, on the other hand, are better suited to this demand. 
Enactive (or, “interactionist”) accounts are the relative newcomers on the scene, and, as mentioned 
in the previous section, resonate with Husserl’s scattered remarks on the centrality of expressive 
behavior and reciprocal interaction to empathy. Such theories seek to ground empathic experience in 
 
10 See Nichols and Stich (2003) for a comprehensive overview and integrated account.  
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the actual temporally extended processes of self-other interaction rather than internal mental states 
with content prescribing accuracy conditions about other minds (Gallagher 2001; De Jaegher et al. 
2010). This kind of view can also be found in Merleau-Ponty, who was a serious scholar of Husserl’s 
work on intersubjectivity, and at times characterizes the “intercorporeal” bodily relation of self and 
other in terms of a systemic whole (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 368-370). 
 Merleau-Ponty is probably the most significant philosopher in the continental tradition when 
it comes to the legacy of Husserl’s account of empathy.11 The chapter “Others and the Human 
World” of his Phenomenology of Perception and his essay “The Philosopher and his Shadow” both take 
up and continue several aspects of Husserl’s theory. Following Husserl’s analysis of the peculiar 
“reversibility” of the touching-touched relation in Ideas II, Merleau-Ponty contends that there is 
already an intersubjectivity of the body that provides the resources to account for awareness of other 
minds (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 364; 1964, 168). In other words, in experiences of auto-affection (e.g., 
touching one’s right arm with one’s left hand) one experiences one’s own body as a material thing – 
the touched – while simultaneously experiencing the body as the organ of the will and locus of 
sensitivity to the world – the touching. Furthermore, that which is touching can at any moment 
reverse into that which is being touched, and vice versa.  
 Later in his career, Merleau-Ponty developed an ontology of the “flesh,” based on this idea 
of reversibility, meant to transcend dualistic thinking and thus consequently dissolve the problem of 
other minds. This ontology of the flesh and its implications for intersubjectivity have been been 
taken up, both critically and charitably, by several feminist philosophers in the continental tradition 
(Olkowski and Weiss 2006). A major criticism of Merleau-Ponty and Husserl on this front is that 
any attempt to locate the genesis of genuine intersubjective experience in bodily auto-affection 
necessarily effaces the genuine alterity of the Other. In other words, Merleau-Ponty’s account of an 
intersubjectivity of the body (which he traces back to Husserl in turn) subsumes the intercorporeal 
encounter (between bodily self and other) under the category of the intracorporeal encounter, and 
thus makes awareness of the other a projection of one’s own self-awareness (Stawarska 2006). 
Arguably, this fails to do justice to the phenomenon for the same reasons as Husserl’s notion of 
pairing: it ultimately makes awareness of others overly dependent on self-awareness.12 
 
11 Although in addition to Merleau-Ponty, Levinas’s (1969) critique of Husserl’s notions of pairing and appresentation in 
Cartesian Meditations.  
12 Alia Al-Saji (2010) offers an interestingly different interpretation that divorces Merleau-Ponty’s account from Husserl’s 
original discussion of touch and auto-affection in Ideas II. For Al-Saji, it is actually Husserl who has more to offer to 
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 This brief overview hardly suffices as an explication of the legacy of Husserl’s investigations 
into empathy and intersubjectivity. Besides Merleau-Ponty, several other major figures in the 
phenomenological tradition have taken up these themes. From Emmanuel Levinas’s development of 
a phenomenologically grounded ethics of alterity, to Alfred Schutz’s (1967) phenomenological 
sociology, Husserl’s influence pervades. Although much of the attention has been and remains 
critical, Husserl’s theory of empathy is an exemplar of phenomenology as a research program: 
sophisticated in detail and scope, holistically integrated within a grand theoretical vision; and yet 
constantly subject to revision, modification, and a willingness to begin anew.   
 
  
 
contemporary feminist discussions of how social, cultural, and political forces constitute bodily subjects in an 
intersubjective field of affective differentiation. 
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